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Summary:  
My name is Pascal Malik and my thesis topic is, “The Resource Curse in Post-Soviet Countries: 
the case of Azerbaijan.” The objective of this Thesis is to establish whether or not Azerbaijan is 
currently, or may in the future, be suffering from the “resource curse.” The aim is to identify and 
analyze multiple economic indicators which may contribute to the development of the “resource 
curse” in Azerbaijan. An analysis is done on the economic reasons for the resource curse as well 
as an analysis of the symptoms of the resource curse and their presence and effect on the 
economy of Azerbaijan. The scope of this thesis is limited to one of the three aspects of the 
resource curse, the economic element, the other two, not covered in this research, are the social 
and political aspects. 
The research in this thesis is based strongly on statistical data as well as economic principles. 
This data is used to analyze the reasons for the “resource curse” such as Dutch Disease, 
fluctuations in commodity prices, underemployment and poverty, and the limitations of oil and 
gas resources, and determine to what extent these are applicable to Azerbaijan. Furthermore, 
this thesis links the symptoms of the “resource curse” such as loss of competition, 
deindustrialization in non-oil sectors, weakness of the agricultural sector, tradable vs. non-
tradable goods and inefficient government spending to the economy of Azerbaijan. The third part 
of the thesis analyzes the methods employed by the government and civil society to mitigate the 
effects of the “resource curse” in Azerbaijan.  
In conclusion, this thesis identifies weakness in the economic sector of Azerbaijan and 
suggestions are made on how to further improve the current methods of mitigation employed by 
the government and civil society to ensure the sustainable development of the economy, 
particularly the non-oil sectors which are those that suffer most from effects of the “resource 
curse.” 
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Xülasə 
Mənim adım Pascal Malikdir və mənim tezis mövzum “Keçmiş Sovet ölkələrində resurs lənəti: 
Azərbaycan nümunəsi”dir. Bu tezisin məqsədi Azərbaycanın indi və ya gələcəkdə “resurs 
lənəti”ndən əziyyət çəkib çəkməyəcəyini müəyyənləşdirməkdir. Məqsəd Azərbaycanda  “resurs 
lənəti”nə səbəb olan amillərin iqtisadi göstəricilərini müəyyən etmək və analiz etməkdir. Resurs 
lənətinə səbəb olan iqtisadi səbəblər üzrə, həmçinin resurs lənətinin simptomlarının analizi və 
onların Azərbaycan iqtisadiyyatında mövcudluğu və təsiri üzrə analiz aparılmışdır. Tezisin 
miqası resurs lənətinin üç aspektindən ancaq birini, iqtisadi amilini əhatə edir. Bu tezisdə əhatə 
olunmayan digər iki amil ictimai və siyasi amillərdir. 
Bu tezisdəki araşdırma tamamilə statistik məlumatlara və iqtisadi prinsiplərə əsaslanır. Bu 
məlumatlar, Holland Sindromu, malların qiymətində qeyri-sabitlik, işsizlik və yoxsulluq, neft və 
qaz ehtiyatlarının məhdudiyyətləri kimi “resurs lənətlərinin” səbəblərini araşdırmaq və bunların 
nə dərəcədə Azərbaycana tətbiq oluna biləcəyini müəyyən etmək üçün istifadə olunur.  Bundan 
başqa bu tezis “resurs lənətinin” rəqabətin itməsi, qeyri-neft sektorunda sənayenin rolunun 
azalması, kənd təsərrüfatı sahəsinin zəifləməsi, satılan malların satılmayan mallarla müqayisəsi 
kimi simtomlarını və hökumətin Azərbaycan iqtisadiyyatına qeyri kafi pul ayırmasını 
əlaqələndirir.Tezisin üçüncü hissəsi Azərbaycanda “resurs lənətinin” mənfi təsirlərini  aradan 
qaldırmaq üçün hökumət və cəmiyyət tərəfindən tatbiq olunan üsulları araşdırır. 
Nəticədə, tezis Azərbaycanın iqtisadi sektorunun zəifliyini üzə çıxarır və iqtisadiyyatın, xüsusilə 
də “resurs lənətinin” təsirindən daha çox əziyyət çəkən  qeyri-neft sektorunun davamlı inkişafı 
üçün hökumət və cəmiyyət tərəfindən tətbiq olunan indiki üsulların gələcəkdə necə 
təkmilləşdirmək yollarını göstərir. 
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Abbreviations: 
ACG – Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil fields 
AMG – Asset Management Guidelines 
AZN – Azerbaijan Manat (National Currency) 
bbl. – Barrel of Oil (bbl./day) 
BP – British Petroleum 
BTC – Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
BTK – Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway 
EITI – Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
EU – European Union 
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
IOC – International Oil Company 
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization 
NRF – Natural Resource Fund 
OPEC – Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PFMC – Public Finance Monitoring Centre 
PWYP – Publish What You Pay 
REER- Real Effective Exchange Rate 
S.U. – Soviet Union 
SOCAR – State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan 
SOFAZ – State Oil Fund of the Republic od Azerbaijan 
UAE – United Arab Emirates 
US- United States 
USSAC – US-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce 
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Introduction: 
 
A frequently debated problem worldwide is that many extractive sector countries experience an 
economic paradox resulting from their resource wealth.  In mineral and oil rich countries this 
phenomenon has been given many names among which are, “the paradox of plenty”, “economic 
indigestion”, “the devil’s excrement” and the most commonly used, “the resource curse”.   
 
The paradox lies in the fact that, despite their abundant resources, the economies of these 
countries have proven over time to do worse than countries which do not have such resource 
wealth.  Resource-led development does not only seem to fail in boosting economic growth but 
in many cases it has been established that the economic and social situation in these countries 
often ends up worse than before the extraction of resources began.1 2
 
 
In the 1970’s, prior to massive increases in oil prices on a global scale, due to action undertaken 
by OPEC, the price per barrel of oil was at $3; in 1980 the price had reached a stunning $30 per 
barrel.3 Prior to this price jump, the economies of oil rich countries were developing at a similar 
rate, but studies show that between 1960 and 1990 oil poor countries had GDP per capita growth 
rates that were 2 to 3 times higher.4
 
 
This paradox has been the focus of much research since the 1980’s and the term “resource curse” 
was used for the first time in economics literature in 1993 by Richard Auty.5
                                                            
1 Open Society Institute. Follow the Money: A Guide to Monitoring Budgets and Oil Revenues. 2004. 
 As can be seen 
above, the “resource curse” leads to poor economic growth but there are also many other factors 
to consider. The resource curse affects resource rich countries on three fronts, economic, social, 
and political. It has been observed that the resource curse can lead to such problems as greater 
2 Overseas Development Institute (ODI). “Meeting the Challenge of the Resource Curse: International Experiences 
in Managing the Risks and Realising the Opportunities of Non-Renewable Natural Resource Revenue 
Management.” January 2006. http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/587.pdf  
3 Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner, “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth,” Development 
Discussion Paper no.517a, Harvard Institute for International Development, 1995. 
4 Svetlana Tsalik, of the Caspian Revenue Watch. Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who will Benefit? Copyright 2003 by 
Open Society Institute. 
5 Richard M Auty. “Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis. London: 
Routledge.” 1993. 
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poverty, slower development, corruption, weaker democracy and in extreme cases even violence 
and civil war.6
 
 
The causal factors behind the resource curse are varied and numerous. Probably the most 
significant of these factors is known as “Dutch Disease.” This term was coined by The 
Economist in 1977 to describe the decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands 
(Groningen) after the discovery of natural gas in the 1960’s. 7
 
 Other factors contributing to the 
“resource curse” include fluctuations in commodity prices, non-renewability of resources, 
underemployment, price shocks/volatility and governance.   
Economists have been working on solutions to mitigate the effects of the “resource curse” and 
according to Weinthal and Luong the most popular solutions emphasize macroeconomic policies, 
economic diversification, natural resource funds, transparency and accountability, and direct 
distribution to the general population.8
 
   
Since its independence in 1991, Azerbaijan has flourished economically due mainly to its 
extensive resources in oil and gas. The questions that must be addressed are, whether or not this 
economic growth is sustainable and what the government can do to ensure the economic stability 
in the future.  Oil and gas are non-renewable resources; Azerbaijan’s government must act today 
to ensure its country’s well-being after its natural resources run out. The aim of this research 
paper is to identify whether Azerbaijan is currently, or on its way to, suffering from the “resource 
curse” by analyzing the economic reasons for the resource curse as well as the economic 
symptoms.  Furthermore an analysis of how to mitigate the resource curse will be made with 
attention to the specific case of Azerbaijan. Given Azerbaijan’s relatively recent independence 
from the Soviet Union, this case may be useful for other newly independent, resource rich, states 
in the region.   
 
 
                                                            
6 Open Society Institute. Follow the Money: A Guide to Monitoring Budgets and Oil Revenues. 2004. 
7 Ingilab Ahmadov, PhD. PowerPoint: Oil Factor’s impact to economy, Dutch Disease. Khazar University 
2009/2010. 
8  Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong (2006). Combating the Resource Curse: An Alternative Solution to 
Managing Mineral Wealth. Perspectives on Politics, 4, pp 35-53 doi:10.1017/S1537592706060051 
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Chapter 1 – International Examples of the Resource Curse and its Mitigation: 
 
This chapter will discuss experiences with the resource curse in resource rich countries around 
the world. The main cases observed are those of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Botswana. It includes a brief discussion of the effects and the methods used to mitigate the 
resource curse in the different countries. The aim is to provide some information for the better 
understanding of the resource curse, its effects, and the way to mitigate them. 
 
The “resource curse” is visible in a large percentage of resource rich countries.  One of the most 
common examples is on the continent of Africa where many resource rich countries have 
experienced the political, social and economic repercussions resulting from their dependence on 
their extractive industries, ranging from minerals to oil and gas. Many sub-Saharan African 
states are plagued with war, poverty, unemployment, lack of industrial diversity, lack of 
transparency and many other factors common to the “resource curse.” Nigeria shows a classic 
case of the “resource curse”.  
 
When considering the oil and gas industry, the most obvious example of the “resource curse” is 
in the Middle East. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, and others, are highly 
dependent on non-tradable industries and oil and gas. These states are vulnerable to shifts in oil 
prices and have accrued massive amounts of national debt as a result.   
 
Saudi Arabia is an ideal example of this fact. “Saudi Arabia’s industry sectors are dominated by 
petrochemicals and petrochemical based products. The main industries in Saudi Arabia include 
crude oil production, petroleum refining, ammonia, industrial gases, sodium hydroxide, 
fertilizers, cement, plastics, metals, construction, commercial ship and aircraft repair.”9
 
 
GDP in Saudi Arabia grew at an average of 1.25 percent per year from 1981-2001, furthermore 
average GDP per capita shrunk approximately 2.5 percent per year.10 In Saudi Arabia GDP per 
capita was higher in 1965, before the massive rise in the price of oil than in 1999.11
                                                            
9 Economy Watch. “Saudi Arabia Industry Sector.”  
 Okaz, a 
http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/saudi_arabia/industry-sector-industries.html  
10  World Bank . “Country at a Glance: Saudi Arabia,” September 23, 2002. 
11 Eric Swanson, et al., World Development Indicators, 2001 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001), pp. 24-26. 
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Saudi news agency, stated that in 2002 that the nominal GDP per capita went from $10,330 in 
1989 to $7,743 in 2001.12
 
 
    “Additionally, a review of the Saudi economy by the International Monetary Fund indicates 
that, with the exception of the year 2000, in which the overall central government budget 
registered a sharp turnaround due largely to a rise in oil prices, "in every other year, the budget 
has run a deficit and the debt stock has run up to $170 billion, which is equal to the size of 
GDP."13 (By comparison, in the European Union, the ratio of public debt to GDP is restricted to 
60 percent.)”14
 
  
Another case of the resource curse can be found in Iran, according to Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, 
“…Iran did not create a globally competitive manufacturing or service sector; while collusion 
between the government and major oil and gas companies, corruption and revenue 
mismanagement wasted income from oil and gas exports and made the economy dependent on 
them. This close relationship between Iran’s oil revenues and its GDP seriously threatens 
economic growth by making it susceptible to ‘Dutch Disease’.”15
 
 
In general, smaller countries are more susceptible to the resource curse as they “…have less 
developed alternative sectors to off-set the effects of revenue volatility and/or long term decline 
in production.”16
 
 
In spite of the abundance of negative impacts on resource rich countries throughout the world, 
there are some countries that have dealt well with their plentiful resources on an economic level. 
According to the World Bank, Indonesia, Malaysia and Botswana are three solid examples of 
countries that have “achieved impressive economic gains despite their resource abundance.”17
 
 
                                                            
12 Okaz, October 19, 2002. 
13 "Article IV Consultation with Saudi Arabia." International Monetary Fund. November 7, 2001. 
14 MERIA (Middle East Review of International Affairs). “SAUDI ARABIA: A BRIEF GUIDE TO ITS POLITICS 
AND PROBLEMS.” Volume 7, No. 3 - September 2003. 
15 Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, of the International Institute for Asian Studies. “The Resource Curse: Oil-based 
Development in Central Asia.” IIAS Newsletter # 4 2 Autumn 2006.  
16 Overseas Development Institute (ODI). “Meeting the Challenge of the Resource Curse: International Experiences 
in Managing the Risks and Realizing the Opportunities of Non-Renewable Natural Resource Revenue 
Management.” January 2006. http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/587.pdf  
17 World Bank. Petroleum Sector Brief Note. “Avoiding the Resource Curse.” No.3, May 2007. 
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Before the oil boom of 1973-1974, Indonesia was in bad shape.  In 1966, a military regime rose 
to power, there was omnipresent corruption, a low adult literacy rate and high levels of linguistic 
and ethnic diversity which are known causes of conflict.18
 
   
During this period, the mid 1960`s, Indonesia was considered one of the poorest countries in the 
world with huge government deficits and hyper-inflation, just under 1,500 percent a year at its 
highest. Despite the military government, with the president having high levels of power, 
Indonesia’s government was able to stave off the resource curse by giving priority to economic 
growth, emphasizing infrastructure, education, capital intensive industry and most importantly 
for the country’s economy, the government invested an unusually high proportion of government 
spending in the agricultural sector (about 20 percent).  Furthermore the country’s economic 
advisors focused on achieving macro-economic stability and tightly controlling inflation and 
budget deficits which resulted in a steep decline in inflation by 1969.19
 
 
“When oil prices fell in the early 1980s, the government reacted swiftly with a series of measures 
that combined expenditure reduction, exchange rate devaluation in 1983 and 1986, and economic 
reform. The response was dramatic. Between 1983 and 1992, the share of manufactures in total 
merchandise exports rose from 7 percent to nearly 50 percent. Some officials have even come to 
regard the collapse of world oil prices as a blessing in disguise.”20
 
 
The actions taken by the Indonesian government were not all good and Indonesia suffered 
greatly from the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, some say more than other Asian countries, but in 
the long run Indonesia has outperformed other resource rich countries and “…has overcome 
unfavorable initial conditions and temptations to squander oil windfalls to achieve impressive 
economic gains.”21
 
 
Malaysia is also a resource rich country but not just in oil, it also possesses significant reserves 
of rubber, tin, and palm. One of the key elements that lead to Malaysia’s success in avoiding the 
                                                            
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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“resource curse” was the high savings rate that allowed capital to be made available for 
investment.22
 
   
“Government expenditures favored education, housing, and health, and achieved a 
geographically balanced distribution.” Furthermore, a compulsory savings scheme was set up 
which required workers to set aside money.  Malaysia’s government also promoted economic 
diversification and export-oriented industrialization to avoid developing a dependence on the 
extractive sectors. The focus, during the early stages of development, was on the development of 
labor intensive industrialization which allowed the use of the extensive pool of workers from 
rural areas.  As the manufacturing sector expanded rapidly, due to foreign investment from 
international firms interested in low labor costs, the government invested heavily in education to 
fill the demand for skilled workers.23 These investment showed their success as enrollment in 
secondary education tripled from 1960-1990.24
 
 
Botswana achieved independence in 1966, at which time it was a very poor nation. However it 
was rich in gem-quality diamond and now ranks among the most successful resource rich 
countries in the world.25 This is due to prudent fiscal policies with regards to revenues obtained 
from the extraction of diamonds. Major parts of the profits from diamond mining have been 
invested in infrastructure development, education health and agriculture.26
 
 It must also be 
considered that diamond prices are less volatile than those of oil. 
Furthermore the government of Botswana developed an index, the budget sustainability ratio, to 
assess its fiscal performance. “It is the ratio of non-investment spending (that is, consumption) to 
non-mineral revenue. A ratio greater than unity indicates that the government is using mineral 
revenues to finance consumption, which is unsustainable in the long run.”27
 
 
                                                            
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Auty, R.M. “Resource Abundance and Economic Development.” 2001. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
25 World Bank. Petroleum Sector Brief Note. “Avoiding the Resource Curse.” No.3, May 2007. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
 7 
 
“Indonesia, Malaysia, and Botswana have all relied on highly trained technocrats and given them 
relative autonomy to run the economy. These examples illustrate that the resource curse is not 
inevitable, but also that a strong political will and commitment to sound economic policies, 
sustained over many years, are needed to avoid it.”28
 
 
Chapter 2 – A Brief Overview of Azerbaijan’s Oil History: 
 
This chapter will discuss the particularity of Azerbaijan as a post-Soviet country. Azerbaijan’s 
extensive history as an oil and gas producing state played an important part in defining the 
country’s role during the Soviet era. Furthermore, the evolution of Azerbaijan that has occurred 
since its independence is briefly discussed. 
 
Azerbaijan has a very long history of oil production spanning back to the 10th century A.D. It is 
believed that Azerbaijan was one of the first countries in the world to recognize the medicinal 
and household uses of oil.  Since the 10th century A.D. oil was extracted from the ground by 
hand digging 10 to 12 meter wells, by the beginning of the 17th century, the capital of 
Azerbaijan, Baku, was surrounded by approximately 500 wells.29
 
 
Simple refining began in Azerbaijan in the 13th century, with the acquisition of low-density oil 
fractions for use in indoor and outdoor lighting. Industrial refining began in 1820’s and the first 
oil-refining plant which produced kerosene from oil was built in Baku in 1863. By 1873, about 
50 oil refineries existed in Baku. Azerbaijan was the first country to obtain oil from the ground 
by drilling oil wells. The first oil well was drilled in Baku between 1848 and 1849.30
 
  
Azerbaijan started to attract interest from foreign investors in 1872, when foreign businessmen 
and businesses, such as the Nobel brothers and the Rothschild’s Bank House, began to acquire 
                                                            
28 Ibid. 
29 Huseynov. “Oil Policy and Strategy of Azerbaijan“. Caspian Region Workshop. Applicability of Norway’s socio-
economic and political strategy as Oil-State for the Caspian Region. 2-3 February 2006, Berlin. 
30 BBC News. “Timeline: Azerbaijan.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1235740.stm  
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oil-rich areas on the Absheron peninsula by tender.31  The Nobel brothers set up an oil-
production company in 1879.32
 
 
As a result of this surge in foreign investment, between 1885 and 1920, Azerbaijan experienced 
an oil boom. “Azerbaijan was [ranked] first in the world in the total amount of oil produced from 
1899 to 1901…made up more than 50% of the world's production. Oil production in the U.S.A., 
at that time amounted to only 9 million tons per year.”33
 
 
The boom was short lived though as the invasion of Azerbaijan by the Bolsheviks in 1920 led to 
the confiscation of all private property such as oil wells and factories. Following this, 
Azerbaijan’s entire oil output was used to fuel the Soviet Union, especially during the WWII.34
Azerbaijan gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, during the 70 years of soviet 
reign Baku produced a large percentage of the Soviet Union’s oil and gas.  When the Soviet 
Union collapsed, Azerbaijan was left with very few, if any, political and economic institutions, 
as during the Soviet era all the power was centralized in Moscow. 
 
 
In 1994, Azerbaijan signed what came to be known as the “contract of the century” with a 
consortium of international oil companies, for the exploration and exploitation of three offshore 
oil fields Azeri, Chirag and the deep-water Portion of the Gunashli (ACG). ACG is located in the 
Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea about 120 km south east of Baku, the Contractual area 
covering about 432.4 sq. km.35 Estimated oil reserves were about 5.2 billion barrels of 
recoverable oil with an additional accumulation of 96 billion cubic meters of associated gas.36
 
 
The consortium consisted of 11 companies, the three biggest investors were SOCAR, the 
national oil company of Azerbaijan (20 percent), BP (17 percent), and Amoco (17 (percent).37
                                                            
31 Huseynov. “Oil Policy and Strategy of Azerbaijan“. Caspian Region Workshop. Applicability of Norway’s socio-
economic and political strategy as Oil-State for the Caspian Region. 2-3 February 2006, Berlin.  
 
32 BBC News. “Timeline: Azerbaijan.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1235740.stm  
33 Huseynov. “Oil Policy and Strategy of Azerbaijan“. Caspian Region Workshop. Applicability of Norway’s socio-
economic and political strategy as Oil-State for the Caspian Region. 2-3 February 2006, Berlin.  
http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/ffu/veranstaltungen/caspian_region_workshop06/Huseynov.pdf 
34 Mir Yusif Mir-Babayev. Azerbaijan's Oil History: A Chronology Leading up to the Soviet Era. Summer 2002 
(10.2) Pages 34-40. 
35 SOCAR. www.socar.az  
36 BP. “Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) contract”:  www.bp.com/caspian 
37 Ibid. 
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This was the first in a series of events that would change the global role of Azerbaijan 
economically and geo-politically.  
 
The ACG contract was the first of 33 production sharing agreement (PSA) contracts which have 
been established to date.  Since then, Azerbaijan began its rapid ascent in terms of GDP, 
according to EconomyWatch.com, Azerbaijan has the third fastest growing economy in the 
world as of 2010. This is greatly due to the rapid increase in the extraction of oil and gas. 
 
In the summer of 2006, Investors completed the BTC pipeline which was essential to 
transporting these massive quantities of oil to international markets as Azerbaijan is a landlocked 
country. The BTC pipeline runs from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey. This allowed for a 
large leap in GDP from 2005 to 2006 with a growth rate of 134.5 percent. The trend continued 
with average GDP growth for the following years exceeding 100 percent according to the Central 
Bank of Azerbaijan.  
 
According to SperoNews, in an article written in 2008, Economists at the IMF warned the 
government of Azerbaijan that institutional reform and economic liberalization would be 
necessary for the country to be able to sustain its future oil wealth. The IMF stated that 
government spending had increased along with oil revenues. Furthermore they warned that in 
combination with an accommodating monetary policy, these factors had led to rising inflation, 
which they stated would have effects on the livelihood of Azerbaijan’s population as well as on 
the state of its non-energy based economy.38
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
38 SperoNews. “Azerbaijan energy profile.”  July 9th 2008. http://www.speroforum.com/a/15709/Azerbaijan-Energy-
profile 
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Chapter 3 – Economic Reasons Behind the Resource Curse: 
 
This chapter will discuss the economic reasons behind the resource curse and attempt to link 
these reasons to the economic climate in Azerbaijan.  There are four main reasons for the 
resource curse covered in this chapter, Dutch disease, fluctuations in commodity prices and their 
effects, underemployment and poverty, and lack of renewability. The aim is to identify whether 
the leading causes for the resource curse are present in Azerbaijan’s economy.  
 
3- 1 - Dutch Disease: 
 
Dutch Disease was a term coined to describe the economic situation that arose in the 1960’s after 
the Netherlands discovered reserves of natural gas.  It is a term often associated to the resource 
curse and is sometimes used interchangeably.  This is incorrect as the phrase “Dutch disease” 
was originally used to describe a specific economic situation.  According to Professor Paul 
Steven of the University of Dundee, it originally referred to the appreciation of the real exchange 
rate.39
 
 
This is caused by heavy investment into a specific extractive industry, in this case oil, causing 
other sectors to suffer from wage and price distress.  This eventually leads to the disproportionate 
growth of non-tradable goods such as construction, transportation and services leading to 
reduced growth in non-oil industries and especially the agricultural sector.40
 
 
“Specifically, Dutch Disease theories predict that the wealth that results from uneven investment 
into the oil sector will appear as higher wages paid in the energy sector (thus attracting workers 
                                                            
39 Professor Paul Stevens. Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy, University of Dundee, UK. 
RESOURCE IMPACT - CURSE OR BLESSING? A LITERATURE SURVEY. 25th March 2003. 
40 Hoffman, David. “Oil and Development in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan,” NBR Analysis, vol. 10, no. 3 (August 1999), 
pp 5-28 
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from other sectors) and will be spent on non-traded goods, thus leading to a real exchange rate 
appreciation that reduces the competitiveness of non-energy sectors.”41
 
 
Considering that increases in exchange rates often entail inflation and rising prices in tradable 
goods, the local sales and exports decline which leads to reduced competitiveness with imported 
goods. Over time as exports decrease and imports increase, local production of tradable goods 
and agricultural goods declines, leading to unemployment and a growing dependence on the oil 
sector.42
 
 
According to a paper written by David I. Hoffman in 1999, Azerbaijan was already showing a 
strong susceptibility to “Dutch disease”.  Hoffman stated that, “Foreign investment in 
Azerbaijan, which comprises 68 percent of total investment, is overwhelmingly concentrated (74 
percent) in the oil sector. Many other preconditions of Dutch Disease are also evident in 
Azerbaijan, including: the strong dependence on a single natural resource, an evaporating 
industrial and agricultural base, the preponderance of state ownership in the economy and in total 
enterprise debt, an autocratic political process with no clear succession mechanism, the 
concentration of political power in a single individual, and time-inconsistent spending decisions, 
evincing an inability to articulate a long-term plan for balanced economic development.”43
 
 
In Figure 1, the composition of GDP in terms of oil related GDP and non-oil related GDP is 
visible. In 2005, the oil-GDP overtook the non-oil GDP and the correlation between the increase 
in total GDP and the increase in oil-GDP is highlighted. Azerbaijan is highly dependent on oil 
exports and judging from figure 1 that dependence is increasing. 
                                                            
41 W. Max Corden, “Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: A Survey,” Working Paper 079, Canberra: 
Australian National University, 1982. 
42 Tsalik, Svetlana of the Caspian Revenue Watch. Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who will Benefit? Copyright 2003 by 
Open Society Institute. 
43 Hoffman, David. “Oil and Development in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan,” NBR Analyisis, vol. 10, no. 3 (August 1999), 
pp 5-28 
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Figure 1.44
 
 Shows the composition of Azerbaijan’s GDP from 2000-2007. 
Figure 2, below, shows the exchange rate for the Azerbaijan Manat (AZN) to different currencies 
in the region from 2000-2009.  The exchange rate compared to the US Dollar or the Euro shows 
a relatively close correlation over the period specified.  One the other hand if a comparison is 
made between the value of the Manat to other currencies in nearby countries like Iran, Turkey, 
Belarus, Estonia and the Ukraine, it is visible that the Manat is a very high valued currency.  
  
Considering the high value of the Manat in comparison to the currencies of other countries it is 
possible to deduce that Azerbaijan goods could be relatively non-competitive on the international 
market when considering goods not related to the extractive industry.  Having such a high valued 
currency is harmful to Azerbaijan’s non-oil related exports.  This fact is supported by the 
statistics in Figure 3.  
                                                            
44 Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan. “Table 1.1 Main Macro-economic Indicators.” 
http://www.cbar.az/assets/92/1.1_eng.pdf 
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Figure 2. 45
 
 Shows the exchange rate of the Azerbaijan Manat (AZN) from 2000 to 2009. 
According to the PFMC, revenues from the oil sector constituted 27 percent of Azerbaijan’s 
GDP in 2004, furthermore taxes paid by the oil sector make up approximately 40 percent of all 
public budget revenues.46
 
 This shows a high dependence on a single extractive industry which is 
one of the major indicators of “Dutch disease.”  
                                                            
45 The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan. “Rate of manat in National Bank of Azerbaijan 
Republic”. http://www.azstat.org/~hagigat/azs_work/statinfo/finance/en/001.shtml 
46 Ibid.   
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Figure 3. 47
 
 Shows trade turnover by groups of goods in 2009 in Azerbaijan. 
As seen in Figure 3, 92.8 percent of exports in 2009 were mineral products. Furthermore, it is 
visible that the biggest imports were machine, electrical technological equipment.   
 
Figure 4 shows that the percentage of the industrial sector representing extractive industry has 
grown steadily over the time period specified.  Furthermore, the percentage representing the 
manufacturing industry has decreased. 
 
                                                            
47 The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan. “Trade Turnover by Groups of Goods in 2009.”  
http://www.azstat.org/publications/azfigures/2010/en/018.shtml  
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Figure 4.48
 
 Shows the Sectorial Structure of Industry in Azerbaijan as a percentage of the total 
over the period of 2000-2009. 
On the other hand, Figure 5. shows that the volume of industrial products from the 
manufacturing industry has increased over the time period specified.  The volume of industrial 
products from the extractive industry has increased at a higher rate thus producing the 
percentages in Figure 4.  
                                                            
48 Ibid. 
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Figure 5.49
 
 Shows the Volume of industrial products produced by different sectors of the 
economy from 2000-2009. 
Furthermore it is visible in Figure 5 that there was a sudden decrease in the volume of industrial 
products originating from the extractive industry from 2008 to 2009. Oil prices boomed in 2008 
reaching record highs of over 120 US dollars per barrel, and a contractual shift in the profit-
sharing ratio of the oil consortium in favor of the government also occurred in 2008. The 
decrease in the volume of extractive industry products may have been a move made by officials 
to adapt the level of supply to falling demand due to heavily inflated oil prices.   
 
Despite the percentages in Figure 4, the volume of industrial products produced by the 
manufacturing sector is increasing.  According to Figure 3, the increases are not visible in 
exports, so one can deduce that these increases are being consumed locally rather than being 
exported to other countries. This shows that exports are not doing well, which may be due to the 
lack of competitiveness of Azerbaijan’s industrial products on international markets (Chapter 3). 
 
                                                            
49 Ibid. 
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Figure 6.50
 
 Shows inflation in terms of GDP deflator and consumer prices in Azerbaijan from 
1996 to 2009. 
According to the World Bank, inflation, GDP deflator is “inflation as measured by the annual 
growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator shows the rate of price change in the economy as a 
whole. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in 
constant local currency.” Furthermore, inflation, consumer prices is “inflation as measured by 
the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average 
consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified 
intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula is generally used.51
 
 
Figure 6. shows us that inflation dropped from 1996 to around 1999 but then began to rise again 
until peaking in 2008 and since then it appears to be on the decline. However Figure 7. shows 
that average annual inflation began to rise again up to October 2010 reaching over 5 percent. 
                                                            
50 World Bank. “Azerbaijan country data.” http://data.worldbank.org/country/azerbaijan 
51 Ibid. 
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Figure 7.52
 
 Shows average annual inflation for 2009 to October 2010. 
There are many schools of thought on the causes of inflation in an economy, in the case of 
Azerbaijan though, it is believed, by the IMF that inflation is caused by the massive revenues 
from oil and gas exports. A certain amount of inflation is inevitable in an economy but high 
inflation leads to lower purchasing power, especially among the poorer ranks of society. Another 
by product is the increase in value of the local currency, as is the case for the Azerbaijan Manat. 
This leads to reduced competitiveness of goods on the international market, thus shrinking the 
tradable sectors of the economy.  
 
The IMF warns of another inflation led problem which may affect the economy of Azerbaijan. 
According to a report in September 2006, “the rapidly expanding economy of oil-rich Azerbaijan 
risks increased inflation if government spending is not reined in. The economy is booming to the 
point that it is overheating," IMF Senior Economist Vitali Kramarenko said.” 53
 
 
According to Investopedia, an economics dictionary, overheating of the economy occurs when, 
“a prolonged period of good economic growth and activity causes high levels of inflation and 
inefficient supply allocations as producers overproduce and create excess production capacity in 
                                                            
52 Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan. http://www.cbar.az/ 
53 BakuTODAY.net. “Oil Boom Overheatinf Azerbaijani Economy: IMF.” September 7th 2006.  
http://www.bakutoday.net/oil-boom-overheating-azerbaijani-economy-imf.html 
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an attempt to capitalize on the high levels of wealth. Unfortunately, these inefficiencies and 
inflation will eventually hinder the economy's growth and cause a recession.”54
 
 
Furthermore, “Economists warn that Azerbaijan is showing early signs of the so-called Dutch 
Disease in which a natural-resources-rich economy sees an increasingly strong local currency 
and shrinking manufacturing sector.”55
 
 
According to the World Bank, there are two arguments against the Dutch Disease case. “First, 
Azerbaijan‘s non-oil trading partners also suffered from currency appreciation.” It states that, 
“the REER for non-oil exports appreciated modestly in 2006-07, and is at the 2002 level.”56
 
  
The Second argument concerns the rate at which Azerbaijan has been “importing” its foreign 
currency. According the World Bank, “it has generally been considered sustainable in that it is 
roughly on par with the permanent income equivalent. Should oil prices stay low, Azerbaijan 
will have to adjust downwards the level of its oil spending permanently, then a case might be 
made for Dutch disease should the economy not adjust.”57
 
 
These arguments are fair, but considering the trends seen in this chapter and in following 
chapters, it is clear that despite these arguments, inflation is high, strong dominance of the 
extractive industry is visible, and non-oil related exports are low and these factors can be 
partially attributed to the effects of Dutch disease. 
 
3 - 2 - Fluctuations in Commodity Prices and their Effects: 
 
Countries that are highly dependent on mineral resources, such as oil, are highly susceptible to 
fluctuations in global prices for those commodities. The biggest challenge that comes from these 
so called price shocks is medium and long term budgeting. Sudden, wide fluctuations in global 
                                                            
54 Investopedia. “Overheated Economy.”  
55 BakuTODAY.net. “Oil Boom Overheatinf Azerbaijani Economy: IMF.” September 7th 2006.  
http://www.bakutoday.net/oil-boom-overheating-azerbaijani-economy-imf.html 
56 World Bank. “Azerbaijan Country Economic Memorandum. A new Silk Road: Export led diversification.” Report 
No. 44365-AZ. December 23rd 2009. 
57 Ibid. 
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market prices can lead to a windfall for the country or if prices drop it can lead to economic 
shock, unexpected budget cuts, and there can be negative effects on economic stability.58
 
  
According to the State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 92.8 percent of 
Azerbaijan’s exports in 2009 consisted of mineral products. Furthermore, the extractive industry 
accounted for 70.1 percent of the industrial sector in the same year.59 In December of 2010, oil 
related GDP in Azerbaijan was 57.7 percent of the total GDP for the same time period.60
 
 
From these statistics it is visible that Azerbaijan is highly dependent on oil and gas revenues and 
fluctuations in these prices on the global market can have severe consequences. The prices for 
gas are mostly based on contracts and are less likely to fluctuate as is the case for oil prices. 
Considering that resources like diamonds are less volatile and susceptible to manipulation to 
ensure high prices, countries like Botswana that have been proven to successfully mitigate their 
resource curse, might have had more ease to do so than oil-rich countries. 
 
When oil prices boomed in 2008, reaching record highs of over $120/bbl., Azerbaijan saw record 
high GDP, with 40137.2 million AZN in December 2008. In January 2009, GDP fell to 1860 
million AZN.61 Price variations like these can have very bad effects on the economy. For 
example, in December of 2008, budget revenues were at 10762 million AZN which fell to 997.4 
million AZN in January of 2009, a 90.73 percent drop in budget revenues in one month. Budget 
expenditures also fluctuate with oil price variations, from December 2008 to January 2009, 
budget expenditures also dropped a dramatic 97.7 percent.62
 
 
Budgeting which is done when prices of commodities are high and income is abundant can be 
affected by economic shock if prices fluctuate unexpectedly.  Many countries turn to borrowing 
as is the case for Saudi Arabia which is rich in oil resources. “…a review of the Saudi economy 
by the International Monetary Fund indicates that, with the exception of the year 2000, in which 
                                                            
58 Jim Shultz. OSI. Following the Money: A Guide to Monitoring Budgets and Oil and Gas Revenues. Page 36. 
November 17 2004. 
59 The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan. “Trade Turnover by Groups of Goods in 2009.”  
http://www.azstat.org/publications/azfigures/2010/en/018.shtml 
60 The Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan, The State Committee on Statistics of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
http://www.cbar.az/assets/92/1.1_eng.pdf 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid.  
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the overall central government budget registered a sharp turnaround due largely to a rise in oil 
prices, "in every other year, the budget has run a deficit and the debt stock has run up to $170 
billion, which is equal to the size of GDP."63 (By comparison, in the European Union, the ratio 
of public debt to GDP is restricted to 60 percent.)”64
 
 This means that due the volatility of oil 
prices, Saudi Arabia was forced to borrow large amounts of money to cover spending when 
forecasted revenues did not meet real revenues. 
 
Figure 8.65
 
 Shows Azerbaijan’s Debt from 1993 to 2008. 
As Figure 8 shows, in 2008, external debt reached 4.3 billion US Dollars (9.3 percent of GDP in 
2008). External debt more than doubled from 2005 to 2008. Figure 8 shows that the 
accumulation of external debt has shown no sign of slowing.  
 
If the trend continues, external debt could rise swiftly in coming years. Considering that the 
current oil and gas reserves of Azerbaijan are forecasted to last about 20 years, the massive 
accumulation of external debt could have a significant negative effect on the economy after 
production runs dry. 
                                                            
63 "Article IV Consultation with Saudi Arabia." International Monetary Fund. November 7, 2001. 
64 MERIA (Middle East Review of International Affairs). “SAUDI ARABIA: A BRIEF GUIDE TO ITS POLITICS 
AND PROBLEMS.” Volume 7, No. 3 - September 2003. 
65 World Bank. “Azerbaijan country data.” http://data.worldbank.org/country/azerbaijan 
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The effects of price shocks are visible in the economy of Azerbaijan due to its high dependence 
on its extractive industry. To help mitigate these effects, other sectors of the economy must be 
developed in an effort to cushion the effects of price shocks. This will help Azerbaijan escape the 
resource curse.  
 
3 – 3 - Underemployment and Poverty: 
 
Figure 9 shows the two main sectors of employment are Agriculture, hunting and forestry (38%) 
and Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, personal and household goods (16%).   
Prior to its Independence, Azerbaijan’s industrial focus was based on the inheritance from the 
Soviet Union with the main sectors being the production of aluminum ore, crude oil, and a 
number of processed foods and high-value agricultural products.  
According to the World Bank, the revenues from the agricultural sector have grown consistently 
at an average of about 5 percent a year, and despite fluctuations, the industrial sector has 
achieved average growth in revenues of 10 percent per year for most years. Many transition 
economies see growth in the service sector, this is also the case for Azerbaijan that saw 
consistent growth of about 10 percent in the service sector per year.66
                                                            
66 World Bank. “Azerbaijan Country Economic Memorandum. A new Silk Road: Export led diversification.” Report 
No. 44365-AZ. December 23rd 2009.  
 23 
 
Figure 9.67
                                                            
67 The State Statistical Committee of The Republic of Azerbaijan. “Distribution of Employed Population by 
Activity.” 2009.  
 Shows the distribution of Employed population by activity in 2009. (Percentage). 
http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/labour/en/002_1.shtml 
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Figure 10.68
 
 Show the Number of people that received official Unemployment status in the 
employment service offices at the end of each year for the period of 1995-2009. 
Figure 10 shows that official unemployment statistics, obtained from the State Statistical 
Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, peaked in 2005 and have been on the decline ever 
since.  Considering the fact that these are official statistics showing only the numbers for people 
who registered with the employment service offices, it is safe to assume that these numbers differ 
due to non-registered workers.  
 
According to the World Bank, formal employment in Azerbaijan increased approximately 13 
percent from 1995-2008, with approximately 80 percent of the growth occurring since 2000.69
 
  
                                                            
68 State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan. “Persons received official unemployment status in 
employment service offices (at the end of year) (person).” http://www.azstat.org/indexen.php  
69 World Bank. “Azerbaijan Country Economic Memorandum. A new Silk Road: Export led diversification.” Report 
No. 44365-AZ. December 23rd 2009. 
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It is important for the government to promote investment in the primary sectors of employment 
in Azerbaijan as there is a real risk that the labor force may shift from these industries towards 
non-tradable industries such as construction in search of better financial prospects. This would 
further slow the growth in the primary industries such as agriculture (which employs the largest 
portion of the labor force) leading to stronger negative effects related to the resource curse on the 
economy. 
 
 
Figure 11.70
 
 Shows the percentage of the total population living under the poverty line in 
Azerbaijan from 2002-2005. Poverty line as defined by the State Statistical Society of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan. 
It is visible from Figure 11 that the percentage of the total population living under the poverty 
line in Azerbaijan has been consistently decreasing since 2002. A close to 50 percent drop in 
poverty is visible in the four year period observed. Furthermore, the government estimates that 
the poverty level fell further to 16.9 percent in 2006.71
                                                            
70 Ibid. 
 
71 Ibid. 
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Figure 12.72
 
 Shows the percentage of the total population living under the poverty line in the 
region of Baku, the Country’s capital, in terms of poor and very poor. 
 
Figure 13.73
                                                            
72 Ibid. 
 Shows the percentage of the total population living under the poverty line in the 
non-Baku urban regions, in terms of poor and very poor. 
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Figure 14.74
 
 Shows the percentage of the total population living under the poverty line in the 
urban regions, in terms of poor and very poor. 
Figures 12, 13 and 14, show that the concentration of poverty is outside Baku, the country’s 
capital city.  Urban areas outside the capital suffer higher levels of poverty and extreme poverty 
than the Capital and rural areas are closely related to non-Baku urban areas.  Generally though, 
there is a visible decrease in poverty across all the strata of Azerbaijan’s society.75
 
  
These figures show that the government must concentrate its efforts to alleviate poverty on rural 
areas especially but also to continue its efforts in urban areas. Education is a key issue which 
must be addressed in rural areas and employment opportunities must be developed with regard to 
the level and focus of new education initiatives.76
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid.  
76 Ibid. 
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Figure 15.77
 
 Shows the Azerbaijan Growth incidence curve for 2002-2005.  This curve shows the 
growth in consumption according to different percentiles of the Azeri population. 
Figure 15 shows that the annual percentage change of consumption per capita was higher for the 
lower deciles of the population that for the higher deciles.  This shows that growth was pro-poor 
over this period.78
 
  
Despite these promising figures, the rate of poverty in rural areas remains almost twice as high as 
in the country’s capital.79 “Lack of employment, assets, and commercial opportunities, as well as 
weaker access to basic infrastructure, health, and educational services have been major factors 
keeping poverty relatively high in provincial towns and rural areas.  Refugees and internally 
displaced people are particularly vulnerable because they not only lack assets and employment 
but also are heavily dependent on state transfers.”80
 
 
                                                            
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
 29 
 
 
Figure 16.81
 
 Shows the nominal average monthly wage in Azerbaijan from 1998-2007. 
As Figure 16 shows, the nominal average monthly wage has increased consistently from 1998, 
where it was at 33.7 Manat, to 2007 where it was at 214 Manat. This is only one of the factors 
leading to the reduction of poverty in Azerbaijan. Other factors include a higher minimum wage, 
significant transfers to households based on government social programs and remittances from 
abroad, especially from Azerbaijan nationals living in Russia.82
 
 
In December of 2009, the minimum wage in Azerbaijan was at 75 Manat.  Between the period of 
2001-2008, the government increased the extremely low minimum wage six-fold. According to 
the World Bank, wages and salaries on average, tripled in real terms since 2000. After 2005, the 
government engaged in an expansive fiscal policy which contributed to these increases.83
 
 
The basic pension of 14 Manat per month in January 2002 increased to 75 Manat per month in 
September 2008. Pensions were the main factor of the government’s social program. 
(Considering that inflation rates in consumer prices (Figure 6.) were increasing throughout this 
period and peaked at over 50 percent in 2008, the actual increases in pensioners consumption 
                                                            
81 Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan. “Table 1.1 Main Macro-economic Indicators.” 
http://www.cbar.az/assets/92/1.1_eng.pdf  
82 World Bank. “Azerbaijan Country Economic Memorandum. A new Silk Road: Export led diversification.” Report 
No. 44365-AZ. December 23rd 2009. 
83 Ibid. 
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capabilities may have been severely affected by inflation in consumer prices.) Furthermore, 
remittances from Azerbaijan national living and working abroad reached $ 1.2 billion in 2008, a 
10 fold escalation in nominal dollar terms since 2001.84
 
  
Overall it seems that Azerbaijan has made big steps in the fight against unemployment and 
poverty, though these figures still remain relatively high in rural areas. A concentration of 
investment should be directed at the primary sectors of the economy, industrial and agricultural 
to ensure continued development. Diversification is key to reducing dependency on resource 
based revenues as well as reducing unemployment and poverty. Furthermore it is important to 
consider education as another essential factor in these efforts.  
 
3 - 4 - Limitations of Oil and Gas resources: 
 
It is a well-established fact that fossil fuels and minerals are developed over millions of years due 
to the pressure and heat underground, meaning these resources are finite.  Countries like 
Azerbaijan must look beyond the temporary revenues achievable through the extraction of their 
natural resources and use those revenues to ensure sustainable economic growth when the 
resources run out.   
 
In the case of Azerbaijan, oil extraction has been said to date back to the 10th century AD.85
 
 It is 
understandable that today Azerbaijan has developed a strong dependence on the oil and gas 
industry. In 2009, according to the State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 
92.8 percent of exports were oil-related. In Figure 17, it is visible that Azerbaijan’s industrial 
sector is dominated by oil related industry. 
On April 1st of 2009, Azerbaijan’s fuel oil reserves amounted to 339,000 tons according to an 
Azerbaijan news agency.86
                                                            
84 Ibid. 
 Furthermore, according to the EIA, Azerbaijan’s proven oil reserves 
totaled 7 Billion bbl and natural gas reserves totaled 30 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in January 
85 Huseynov. “Oil Policy and Strategy of Azerbaijan“. Caspian Region Workshop. Applicability of Norway’s socio-
economic and political strategy as Oil-State for the Caspian Region. 2-3 February 2006, Berlin.  
86 Rufat Abbasov. “Fuel oil reserves in Azerbaijan make up 338,100 tons.” News.AZ. 24th of April 2010. 
http://www.news.az/articles/14135 
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2009.87 According to Svetlana Tsalik of the Open Society Institute’s Revenue Watch Program, 
production of oil is expected to taper off in the next 20 years if no new reserves are found.88
 
 
 
Figure 17.89
 
 Shows the gross volume of industrial products produced in Azerbaijan from January 
to October of 2010. 
Figure 17 shows that the bulk of products produced by Azerbaijan Industry are related to oil. 
Considering that oil and gas are non-renewable products and that experts like Svetlana Tsalik 
believe that the current reserves of Azerbaijan will not last longer than 20 more years, it is 
essential that the government encourage the shift of industrial products towards non-oil related 
industry. The key to this is investment and diversification among other possible strategies. 
 
One good example of forward thinking on the part of Azerbaijan is the BTK (Baku-Tbilisi-Kars) 
railway project which will run from Azerbaijan, through Georgia and into Turkey. This rail 
project is a step forward in diversification for Azerbaijan as it will join the West (Europe) with 
                                                            
87 EIA. “Azerbaijan: Oil.” http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Azerbaijan/Oil.html  
88 Svetlana Tsalik, of the Caspian Revenue Watch. Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who will Benefit? Copyright 2003 by 
Open Society Institute. 
89 State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan. External Economic Activities: Exports by group. 
http://www.azstat.org/MESearch/details  
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the East (Asia) turning Baku into a transportation hub. This project is often referred to as the 
silk-road, as it will serve as a trade passage along the ancient Silk Road which allowed trade 
between East and West. The total cost of the project is estimated at 600 million US dollars and is 
expected to be completed in 2012.90
 
 
Projects such as this are very important for Azerbaijan and may lead to more opportunities in the 
future as they attract foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as providing employment. 
 
In light of limited oil and gas reserves, it is important to use the current revenues to establish 
sustainable industry in Azerbaijan. The government must decide where the country wants to be 
in 20 years, after their resources begin to dwindle, how they want to get there, and how they will 
go on from that point.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
90 Railway-Technology.com. “Baku, Tbilisi, Kars line, International.” http://www.railway-
technology.com/projects/baku-tbilisi-kars/ 
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Chapter 4 - Economic Symptoms of the Resource Curse in Azerbaijan: 
 
This chapter focuses on the economic symptoms of the resource curse and attempts to identify 
whether these symptoms are visible in Azerbaijan’s economy.  It consists of five parts, loss of 
competition, deindustrialization in non-oil sectors (symptom of Dutch disease), tradable vs. non-
tradable goods, non-efficient government spending, and the shrinking agricultural sector. 
 
4 -1 - Loss of Competition 
 
The loss of competition in local and global markets is a common effect of the resource curse.  
Dutch disease leads to the appreciation of the currency, which in turn pushes up the prices of 
exports and local goods. It becomes cheaper for trade partners to import goods from alternative 
countries and it also becomes cheaper for local retailers to import and sell goods on the local 
market which originate from foreign countries.   
 
Figure 18 shows the geographical structure of external trade relations in 2009 in Azerbaijan.  The 
important thing to underline is that for 2009, 92.8 percent of exports were related to oil (Figure 
3), which tells us that the balance of trade in non-oil related products is very much in favor of 
imports. Total trade turnover for 2009 was 20818.2 Million Us dollars, imports totaled 6119.7 
Million US dollars, and exports totaled 14698.5 Million US dollars.91
                                                            
91 Ibid. 
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Figure 18.92
 
 Shows the geographical structure of external trade relations in 2009 as a percentage 
of the total.  
The main trading partners on the EU are Italy (also the largest overall trading partner with a trade 
turnover of just under 4 billion US dollars in 2009), France and Germany. The US is 
Azerbaijan’s second biggest trading partner. In Asia Russia is its biggest trading partner followed 
by Turkey.  
 
 
Figure 19.93
                                                            
92 Ibid.  
 Shows the Balance of Payments for the Republic of Azerbaijan for the year 2009. 
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Figure 19 shows that Azerbaijan oil-exports in 2009 surpassed 20 billion US dollars while 
exports from the non-oil sectors of the economy consisted of just over 1 billion US dollars. On 
the other hand non-oil related imports totaled just under 6 billion US dollars. Revenues from oil 
exports are 20 times higher than revenues from non-oil exports. 
 
If Azerbaijan had stopped exporting oil in 2009, the revenues from exports would have been only 
4.76 percent of what they were.  This would have had catastrophic economic effects on the 
economy. The lack of non-oil exports shows the weakness of the non-oil based economy and the 
urgent need for development in the non-oil sector.  
 
One certain way to promote competition is by investing in local economy. Figure 20 shows 
levels of investment from 2000-2009, both internal investment and foreign investment. It is 
visible that most foreign investment is made in the oil industry. The rest of foreign investment is 
made in the form of credit. It is clear that the majority of foreign investment in Azerbaijan is 
directed at the oil industry. It would be highly beneficial to the local economy to receive 
investments on other sectors. 
 
 Also visible in Figure 20 is a significant decline in internal and foreign investment in the 
economy. This fall in investment coincides with the drop in the volume of products produced by 
the extractive industry in the same year (Figure 5). The boom in oil prices may have led to an 
excess in demand in the oil industry thus forcing officials to reduce supply to compensate. 
Furthermore in 2008, a contractual shift in the profit-sharing ratio of the oil consortium in favor 
of the government also occurred. This may have affected the level of foreign investment.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
93 Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan. “Table 1.1 Main Macro-economic Indicators.” 
http://www.cbar.az/pages/statistics/external-sector-statistics/  
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Figure 20.94
 
 Shows investments directed into the economy of Azerbaijan, from foreign sources 
as well as internal investment. Furthermore it shows how foreign investment is distributed 
between investment in the oil industry and investment in financial credits. 
Diversification in investments would allow Azerbaijan to move away from its dependence on oil 
revenues. Investing in different sectors of the economy would promote long term sustainable 
growth.  Figure 21 shows that the increase in the number of acting enterprises in Azerbaijan has 
grown slowly over the period specified.  The growth from 2000-2005 exceed the growth from 
2005-2009.  
                                                            
94 State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan. “Azerbaijan in Figures: Investments directed to 
economy.” http://www.azstat.org/publications/azfigures/2010/en/020.shtml  
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Figure 21.95
 
 Shows the number of acting enterprises in Azerbaijan from 2000-2005. 
This trend is worrying as it shows that little of the foreign and internal investment visible in 
Figure 20 is going into the promotion of new enterprises in different economic sectors. 
Investment in new enterprises could result in the increase of competitiveness on global markets, 
as the rise in volume produced often leads to decreases in production costs.  
 
Overall, there is a need for investment in the non-oil sectors of the economy in order to allow 
goods produced in Azerbaijan to be more competitive on international markets. The volume of 
tradable goods should increase and the prices must be competitive. To achieve this there is a 
need for major investments in modern, more productive machinery. 
 
4 -2- Deindustrialization of the Economy: 
 
Another symptom of Dutch disease, the deindustrialization of non-oil sectors is a common result 
of the appreciation of the local currency which leads to loss of competitiveness. When it is no 
longer attractive to produce certain goods and services, stakeholders often abandon the industry 
to seek more rewarding opportunities.   
 
                                                            
95 Ibid. 
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Figure 22 shows the number of people engaged in industry from 2000-2009. It is visible that 
more people were engaged in industry in 2000 than in 2009. Figure 9 shows that only 1 percent 
of the population is employed in the extractive industry and that the biggest portion of the 
population is employed by the agricultural sector (38 percent).  
 
 
Figure 22.96
 
 Shows the number of people engaged in industry in Azerbaijan from 200-2009. 
Figure 23 shows that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was large scale de-
industrialization until 1998 when the figures began to take an upward turn. This change though 
has been very slow and is proportional to the decrease of the number of people engaged in the 
agricultural sector since 1998. This shows that the labor force is leaving the primary industry and 
moving towards other forms of industry.  
Furthermore it is visible that overall, the number of people involved in services has been on the 
rise since Azerbaijan’s independence. Services are part of the non-tradable sector and movement 
away from the tradable sector towards the non-tradable sector is a sure sign of de-
industrialization.  
                                                            
96 Ibid.  
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Figure 23.97
 
 Shows the percentage of the total work force employed by sector of the economy.  
According to the IMF, in 2008, “non-oil activity responded strongly to the exceptional fiscal 
stimulus and growth accelerated to about 15 percent, led by a robust expansion in construction, 
services and agriculture.” On the other hand, “non-oil GDP growth slowed from 16 percent in 
2008 to 3 percent in 2009.” The IMF expected non-oil GDP growth recover and rise to 4.2% in 
2010.98
 
 
Despite these reports, Azerbaijan’s state budget expenditures in the economy and in social and 
cultural activities have increased at a rapid rate in recent years. According to the state statistical 
committee, expenditures for the financing of the economy increased from 444.7 million Manat in 
2005 to 4373.9 million Manat in 2009. This shows that the government is increasing their 
investments in the national economy at a rapid rate. Furthermore, investments in social and 
cultural activities increased from 843.3 million Manat in 2005 to 2763.0 million Manat in 2009. 
The largest increases in expenditures have been seen in education and in funding for social 
                                                            
97 World Bank. “Azerbaijan country data.” http://data.worldbank.org/country/azerbaijan  
98 IMF. “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2010 Article IV Consultation with Republic of Azerbaijan.”  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2010/pn1058.htm 
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security. Despite this, health care has only seen a relatively small rise in state budget 
expenditures with an increase of only 287.1 million Manat from 2005 to 2009.  
 
The efforts to direct more state expenditures to the economy and to social and cultural activities 
play an essential role in mitigating the effects of the resource curse. According to the figures 
though, despite considerable increases in spending, the non-oil sector of the economy is still 
being overshadowed by the oil sector. 
 
There are elements indicating that de-industrialization has been occurring in Azerbaijan. The 
movement of the labor force towards the non-tradable sector such as services, and away from the 
primary industrial sector, agriculture, along with the extremely slow increase in labor in the 
industrial sector, since 1998, all points to de-industrialization. In the following part of this 
chapter, the most worrying element of de-industrialization is addressed, the weakness of the 
agricultural sector in Azerbaijan.  
 
4 - 3 – Weakness of the Agricultural Sector: 
 
Agriculture is commonly a supporting pillar for many economies; many countries owe a large 
portion of their GDP to their agricultural sector, China (10.6 percent), India (17 percent), 
(Mozambique (28.7 percent), Nepal (35 percent), Nigeria (33.1 percent), Pakistan (20.8 percent), 
and Sudan (32.1 percent). These countries are developing countries and rely heavily on 
agriculture to support their economies.   
 
According to the USACC (US –Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce), nine of the world’s eleven 
climate zones, that provide the perfect environment for the cultivation of a wide variety of 
agricultural products, are present in Azerbaijan. Furthermore the USACC states that multiple 
agricultural products, (among which are pomegranate, feijoa, grape juice, olives, tomatoes, 
forestry, cotton, tobacco, berries, and hazelnuts), produced in Azerbaijan are competitive on 
international markets.99
 
 
                                                            
99 USACC. “U.S. - Azerbaijan Food and Agriculture Trade Mission - 21-26 May, 2007.” 2007. 
http://usacc.org/content.php?type=event&id=3205  
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“Since almost 50% of Azerbaijan's population resides in rural areas, the food and agriculture 
sector constitutes an important part of the job market. In 2005, some 39 percent of workers were 
engaged in the agriculture and forestry business. Rural development is a top priority for the 
Azerbaijani government and demand for agricultural input is growing rapidly.”100
 
 
A shrinking agricultural sector is a sure sign of the resource curse. Oil and gas revenues lead to 
investments in the non-tradable sectors of the economy (Chapter 4-4.) such as construction and 
transportation. This is called de-industrialization (Chapter 4-2.) which is a major symptom of 
Dutch Disease (Chapter 3-1.).  The agricultural sector is often hard hit by de-industrialization 
due to lack of investment and movement of the work-force towards other sectors of the economy 
in search for better prospects.  
 
In the case of Azerbaijan, the agricultural sector employs the largest portion of the population 
(Chapter 3-3.) The agricultural sector is essential to the economy. 
 
 
Figure 24.101
                                                            
100 Ibid. 
 Shows the percentage of the population employed in the Agriculture, Hunting and 
Forestry sector from 2000 to 2009.  
101 The Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan. http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/labour/en/002_1.shtml 
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The decline in the percentage of the population employed in agriculture, hunting and forestry 
from 2002 onwards (Figure 24) can be explained by an increase in the percentage of the 
population employed in the construction sector.102
 
 Construction is a growing sector in 
Azerbaijan and may offer better prospects to the labor force than agriculture.  
 
Figure 25.103
 
 Shows the income from the Agriculture and Forestry sector vs. Income from the 
Industrial sector from 1995 to 2009. 
                                                            
102 World Bank. “Azerbaijan Country Economic Memorandum. A new Silk Road: Export led diversification.” 
Report No. 44365-AZ. December 23rd 2009. 
103 The Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
http://www.azstat.org/~hagigat/azs_work/statinfo/agriculture/en/005.shtml   
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Figure 26104
 
 shows the contribution to the total GDP, of the agriculture and forestry sector vs. 
that of the industrial sector from 1995-2009. 
Figure 25 shows that revenues from the agriculture and forestry sector of the economy have been 
increasing over the period specified. On the other hand it is also visible in Figure 26 that the 
percentage of the nation’s GDP that the agricultural and forestry sector represents is in decline 
over the same period. This shows that despite the increase in revenues, the agricultural sectors 
contributions to GDP are decreasing in importance.   
 
Furthermore Figure 25 shows a steep increase in the revenues from industry over the same 
period as well as an increase in the industries revenues as a percentage of GDP in Figure 26.  
This can lead to the conclusion that the industrial sector in Azerbaijan is increasingly 
contributing to the nations GDP while the role of the agricultural and forestry sector is 
decreasing.  
 
These figures can be explained by a lack of investment in the agricultural sector as can be seen 
below as well as the high value of the Manat. (Chapter 3-1.) 
                                                            
104 Ibid. 
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Figure 27.105
 
 Shows the Volume of Investment in agriculture as a percentage of total investments 
for each year for the period of 1995-2009. 
Figure 27 shows that investment in agriculture has more than tripled since 2006. As a share of 
total investment though, 3.5 percent represents 266.6 million Manat, which is only 8.3 percent of 
the investments that go into industry.   
 
Investing in the agricultural sector of the economy could allow Azerbaijan to move away from 
their dependence on the oil and gas industry. Furthermore, a part of Azerbaijan’s agricultural 
products are currently competitive on the international market, increasing the amount of 
agricultural products to combat the trade imbalance between imports and exports of non-oil 
related products in Azerbaijan.  
 
The current situation in the agricultural sector reflects the general situation in the non-oil based 
sectors of industry. Despite projects such as the Samur Absheron irrigation system, which 
received 112.1 million Manats from January to September 2010 from the State Oil Fund, there is 
very little growth visible in the agricultural sector. The percentage of the labor force involved in 
agricultural activities is shrinking, oil and gas revenues are dwarfing agricultural revenues and 
                                                            
105 Ibid.  
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the appreciation of the Manat is leading to a lack of competiveness in global markets, a situation 
which will be made worse if the volume of agricultural goods decreases.  
 
Investments in the agricultural sector of the economy are vital, whilst they are increasing in 
Azerbaijan there is a need for much larger volumes of investment to ensure that this sector, 
which is the primary employer in the country, grows and prospers.  Agricultural products are 
among the few industrial products of Azerbaijan that are competitive on international markets106
 
 
and the development of this sector is essential to fighting the “resource curse.” 
4 - 4 - Tradable vs. Non-tradable goods: 
 
Tradable goods can be defines as goods that can be sold in another location, distant from where 
they were produced. Furthermore tradability of the goods depend on the cost of transportation 
and the shelf-life of the goods, if these factors are lower the goods are more tradable. Tradable 
goods consist mainly of light industry, agricultural products, cars and other such products.107
 
 
Non-tradable goods are typically difficult or impossible to sell in locations distant from their 
place of manufacturing. The shorter the shelf-life and the higher the cost of transportation, the 
less tradable goods are. Non-tradable goods consist of products such as construction, services 
and construction materials.108
 
 
The growth of sectors of the economy producing non-tradable goods is one of the symptoms of 
Dutch disease. Spending revenues from resource extraction on the production of non-tradables in 
favor of tradable goods causes the tradable sector to shrink, thus leading to loss of 
competitiveness in global markets as non-tradables are non-competitive.109
  
  
According to Dr. Ingilab Ahmadov, “the real exchange rate is defined as the price of non-
tradable goods in relation to tradable goods. A real appreciation means that non-tradable goods 
                                                            
106 USACC. “U.S. - Azerbaijan Food and Agriculture Trade Mission - 21-26 May, 2007.” 2007. 
http://usacc.org/content.php?type=event&id=3205 
107 Ingilab Ahmadov, PhD. PowerPoint: Oil Factor’s impact to economy, Dutch Disease. Khazar University 
2009/2010. 
108 Ibid.  
109 Ibid. 
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have become more expensive in relation to tradable goods – either because the nominal exchange 
rate has appreciated or because domestic price inflation (non-traded sector) is higher than abroad 
(traded sector).”110
 
 
According to a study conducted and Fariz Huseynov by Fakhri Javanshir Hasanov , “By using 
quarterly data from 2001-2007 and applying various approaches, we estimate real equilibrium 
exchange rate misalignment for Azerbaijani Manat (AZN) and find that AZN is slightly 
overvalued.”111
 
 
Figure 28 shows that the percentage of investment in the economy of Azerbaijan is highest in 
Industry, furthermore we see a large proportion of investment in sectors like transportation and 
communication which are non-tradable as is construction.  
 
   
Figure 28.112
                                                            
110 Ibid. 
 Shows the Volume of Investment in Fixed Sectors of the Economy of Azerbaijan 
from 1995-2009 as a percentage of total investment. 
111 Hasanov, Fakhri Javanshir and Huseynov, Fariz, Real Exchange Rate Misalignment in Azerbaijan (November 20, 
2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1522297   
112 The Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan.  
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Figure 29 shows that employment in non-tradable sectors of the economy has grown in 
Azerbaijan from 2000-2009 with the exception of electricity, gas and water supply and 
distribution.  Considering that employment has risen as a whole throughout the economy, this is 
not surprising, but a considerable growth in the construction, transportation, storage and 
communications, and the real estate, renting and business activities sectors shows a shift of 
employed population towards the non-tradable sector. 
 
The World Bank states that, “new opportunities in construction (initially in the oil sector, but 
also in real estate and later in the public sector) contributed to reducing the share of employment 
in the primary sectors (agriculture and fishing) by approximately 2.5 percentage points.”113
 
 
 
Figure 29.114
 
 Shows the number of people employed by economic activity from 2000-2009. 
                                                            
113 World Bank. “Azerbaijan Country Economic Memorandum. A new Silk Road: Export led diversification.” 
Report No. 44365-AZ. December 23rd 2009.  
114 Ibid. http://www.azstat.org/publications/azfigures/2010/en/005.shtml  
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Movement of the population from tradable to non-tradable sector along with higher investment 
in non-tradable sector than in tradable sector are elements that should be of concern to the 
government. Azerbaijan needs to promote the development of all non-oil based industry so as to 
allow it to decrease its dependence on the oil and gas industry. Increasing the volume of 
production in general is good but moving the manufacturing sector towards the production of 
non-tradable goods and away from tradable goods is not a sustainable way to do so.  
 
Keeping in mind that increasing exports in Azerbaijan is an essential part of avoiding the 
resource curse, non-tradable goods cannot be exported. Only the tradable sector can contribute to 
exports. Developing the tradable sectors of the economy is essential to Azerbaijan’s future. 
 
4 - 5 - Inefficient Government Spending: 
 
Another symptom of the resource curse is the inefficiency of government spending. According to 
Sventlana Tsalik, the inflow of large revenues from the extractive sector of the economy can lead 
to political leaders being shielded from sensible economic planning for the future as well as 
political accountability. She claims that if a political leader can offer a growing pot of resources 
for local projects, it offers little incentive for them to make difficult choices about reducing 
dependence on mineral resources, or to reduce inefficiency in government spending and planning 
for the future.115
 
 
In resource rich countries, there is often a tendency to invest in “white elephants.” The term 
white elephant originated in the 1850’s, from a “tale that the King of Siam would award 
a disagreeable courtier a white elephant, the upkeep of which would ruin the courtier.” This term 
is used in economics to describe projects with high operational costs or opportunity costs which 
may not have been considered before the implementation of the project.116
 
 
                                                            
115 Svetlana Tsalik, of the Caspian Revenue Watch. Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who will Benefit? Copyright 2003 by 
Open Society Institute. 
116 Dictionary.com. “Definition: White Elephant.” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/white+elephant  
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It is tempting for oil rich countries to engage in projects which, in the long run, may turn out to 
be white elephants.117 118 According to Gorkhmaz Askarov, the government of Azerbaijan often 
engages in projects which might be classed as white elephants. Allegedly, the government builds 
bridges and roads that “require reconstruction immediately after completion,” or which are 
“reconstructed repeatedly.” Furthermore it considers the construction of Baku’s sea port, which 
cost 300 million US dollars, to be a white elephant project due to the fact that Azerbaijan has no 
direct access to the sea.119
 
   
Furthermore Askarov claims that, “For all of these projects, there is a significant disproportion 
between their social necessity and their implementation costs. Spending this much money on 
such "white elephants," which are not expected to generate wealth, has led to the rapid 
appreciation of the manat on the one hand, and on the other, the currency's declining purchasing 
power on the domestic market.”120
 
  
White Elephants are only one part of inefficient government spending, as seen in the previous 
chapter, favoring investment in non-tradable sectors over tradable sectors of the economy leads 
to the reduction in competitiveness in the long term. Furthermore, spending for political purposes 
such as elections is inefficient. According to Sveltlana Tsalik, “the government of Azerbaijan 
spent 100 million US dollars from the oil fund to pay for pensions and to raise civil service 
salaries in an election year.”121
 
 
According to the Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the state budget showed a 
consistent deficit throughout the period of 1997 to 2005 as shown in Figure 30. Furthermore 
from the period of 2006 to 2009, the state budget has shown consistent surpluses except in 
March 2006. Deficits were also seen in December 2007, and December 2009.
                                                            
117 For examples of alleged white elephant projects please visit http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_elephant to view 
a list of global cases. 
118 For futher examples of alleged white elephant on the continent of Africa please visit MSNBC at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22380448/ns/world_news-africa/  
119 Gorkhmaz Askarov. “Viewpoint: Azerbaijans’ White Elephants.” RFLERL. 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079690.html 
120 Ibid.  
121 Svetlana Tsalik, of the Caspian Revenue Watch. Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who will Benefit? Copyright 2003 by 
Open Society Institute. 
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Figure 30.122
 
 Shows the deficit of the state budget of Azerbaijan from 1997-2005. 
Figure 30 shows that during the period of 1997 to 2005, the expenditures of the state budget 
exceeded the revenues. This shows inefficiency in spending. Since 2006, the state budget of 
Azerbaijan has consistently received more revenues than the amount of expenditures. 
 
 
                                                            
122 Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan. “Table 1.3. Major indicators of the State Budget of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan” http://www.cbar.az/assets/94/1.3_eng.pdf  
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Figure 31.123
 
 Shows the deficit/surplus of the state budget as a percentage of GDP for each year 
from 1997 to 2009. 
Figure 31 shows that the deficit seen from 1997 to 2005 represents between 2.4 and 0.7 percent 
of GDP which is low. Furthermore, the surpluses seen in the period of 2006 to 2009 peaked in 
2008 at 7.85 percent of GDP.  
 
The peak in the budget surplus in 2008, which can be seen in Figures 30 and 31, can be partially 
attributed to the increased income of profit taxes which jumped from 2457.7 million Manat in 
2007 to 2862.3 million Manat in 2008. Revenue from profit taxes then fell to 1329.2 million 
Manat in 2009 causing the decrease in the budget surplus over this period.124 Furthermore, the 
non-tax revenues increased from 793.8 million Manat in 2007 to 4037.7 million Manat in 2009 
according to the State Statistical Committee. This was a 509 percent rise in non-tax revenues.125
 
 
This increase can be partially contributed to an 88% increase in transfers from SOFAZ from 
2007 to 2008 raising the share of SOFAZ transfers in the state budget from 9.7 percent to 35.3 
percent. 
In Figure 32, it is visible that the state budget receives a large part of its revenues from oil related 
source. Profit tax and a large part of non-tax revenues result from the oil industry. 
 
 
                                                            
123 Ibid. 
124 Ingilab Ahmadov, PhD, Kenan Aslanli. “State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan Republic: from single account to main 
Source of public finance.”  November 2010. PFMC 
125 State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan.”State Budget Revenues and Expenditures.” 
http://www.azstat.org/publications/azfigures/2010/en/020.shtml 
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Figure 32.126
 
 Shows the composition of the revenues received by the state budget from 2000-
2005. 
                                                            
126 Ibid. 
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Figure 33.127
 
 Shows the composition of revenues received by the state budget as a percentage of 
total revenues received from 2000-2009. 
Figure 33 shows that the percentage of revenues represented by oil related income is high in 
relation to non-oil related income. The rapid growth in the percentage that non-tax revenues 
contribute to the budget can be partially explained by increases, since 2007, in the volume of 
transfers from SOFAZ to the state budget. 
 
Considering that 57.7 percent of GDP in September 2010 was oil-related, it is possible to 
conclude that the majority of revenues to the state budget are oil-related. Thus the efficiency of 
expenditures is questionable. The majority of revenues received by the state budget results only 
from the sale of oil and gas then the proportion of non-oil revenues to expenditures is 
imbalanced. It is the amount of revenues received from the extractive industries that pushes up 
the expenditures. 
 
                                                            
127 Ibid. 
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Figure 34.128
 
 Shows the non-oil deficit of Azerbaijan as a percentage of the non-oil GDP from 
2009 to 2011. * the figures for 2011 are estimated by the IMF. 
Figure 34 shows that the non-oil deficit in Azerbaijan was above 38 percent in 2009 and 2010 
despite surpluses in the state budget for the same period. The IMF estimates that the non-oil 
budget deficit will drop to 34.7 percent in 2011. Furthermore the IMF estimates that the state 
budget surplus will rise to 14.4 percent of general GDP in 2011. 
 
Despite the predicted drop in 2011 of the non-oil deficit, the figures are still high. According to 
ABC.az, “Market sources say that non-oil sector of Azerbaijan’s economy is plunging into crisis 
in connection with lack of working capital and investments.”129
                                                            
128 ABC.AZ. “Azerbaijan’s non-oil deficit to fall to 34.7% of non-oil GDP.” October 28th 2010. 
 It is essential that the 
government increase investments to avoid further de-industrialization of the non-oil sectors of 
the economy.  
http://abc.az/eng/news/49051.html 
129 ABC:AZ. “Non-oil Sector of Azerbaijani Economy to Stop in 4-6 Months.” November 22nd 2010. 
http://abc.az/eng/news/49558.html 
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Chapter 5 - How to Mitigate the Resource Curse - Azerbaijan Experience:  
 
According to Svetlana Tsalik, it is very challenging to minimize the negative impacts oil 
revenues may have on resource rich countries, especially on oil-rich countries, this may be the 
case even when leaders are driven by good intentions to create economic and human 
development from resource wealth. Countries with weak or developing democratic institutions, 
public administration systems and civil services are most vulnerable to the resource curse.130
 
 
One of the problems Azerbaijan faces is that its institutions, systems and services are young and 
immature. During the Soviet era, Azerbaijan had few or no institutions as all the power and 
decision making was concentrated in Moscow. Since its independence, Azerbaijan has had to 
deal with both the development of its institutions as well as the development of its primary 
industry, the extractive Industry.  
 
There are three main reasons why Azerbaijan must correctly manage its oil wealth. First, 
Azerbaijan’s economy is particularly dependent on its oil industry, more so than other Caspian 
states such as Kazakhstan which has triple the proven and potential oil reserves and about four 
times more proven and possible gas reserves. Two thirds of industrial production in Azerbaijan is 
dominated by the oil sector which comprises over 90 percent of its exports. Furthermore, 
Azerbaijan has experienced, “the inflation, real exchange rate appreciation, and crowding out of 
the non-oil sector that is symptomatic of Dutch Disease.”131
 
 
Secondly, Azerbaijan’s oil production is estimated to peaked in 2014, output will slow down 
until 2020, and in 2035 production will decrease to 0.9 million bbl./day .132
 
 This means that 
Azerbaijan has a short period to maximize the potential gains that its oil and gas reserves have to 
offer. 
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Thirdly, due to the on-going Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, approximately 800, 000 Azerbaijanis 
have been internally displaced. This ads a further burden to the government which has to “restore 
normal lives to this displaced population.” 133
 
 
In this chapter a discussion is undertaken on methods used to mitigate the effects of the resource 
curse in Azerbaijan. An analysis is done of the tools and methods used by the state as well as 
NGO’s to minimize the negative impact of oil revenues and maximize potential benefits. Three 
important areas are covered in this chapter, an analysis of SOFAZ, transparency, and the 
establishment and function of NGO’s. 
 
5 - 1 - Sovereign Wealth Fund - SOFAZ: 
 
The State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan was established on December 29th 1999 by 
presidential decree #240, "On Establishment of the State Oil Fund of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan". “Statutory Regulations of the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan was 
approved by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan # 434 dated December 29, 2000.”134
 
 
The fund acts as both a stabilization fund and a savings fund to secure oil and gas revenues for 
future generations. It is neither one nor the other, but according to Svetlana Tsalik, “its rules are 
ambiguous enough to allow it to be used for either.” Furthermore the fund also serves to stabilize 
the exchange rate, through sterilization, by keeping foreign currency received from the sale of oil 
and gas out of the monetary system. Another possible function of the fund is to help cushion the 
budget against price shocks. 135
 
 
The oil fund was a creation resulting from close collaboration between the IMF, the World Bank 
and the government of Azerbaijan. The motivation for the establishment of the fund came from 
the governments understanding of the problems other developing countries had encountered in 
managing oil wealth. In SOFAZ’s annual report they explain that, “the experience of oil-rich 
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countries suggests that oil revenues easily gained are not always rationally used. Indeed, 
excessively high misuse and internal dealings can be observed in most cases…Preventing such 
misuse and strengthening financial discipline…were also major reason for [the] establishment of 
the State Oil Fund.”136
 
 
As Svetlana Tsalik states, SOFAZ has had a positive impact since its establishment both due to 
its help in mitigating the real exchange rate and in improving the international image of 
Azerbaijan. She states that Fitch, a global ratings agency, elevated the rating for Azerbaijan to 
BB in 2002, stating that this was specifically due to the creation of the Oil Fund.137
 
 
Founding documents of the Oil Fund suggest that its purpose is to promote the non-oil sector as 
well as human development. However, there are no criteria on how the expenditures are to be 
selected. This has led to diverse expenditures ranging from providing assistance to refugees to 
funding projects such as the BTC pipeline. According to Tsalik, “SOFAZ is subordinate directly 
to the president and lacks sufficient mechanisms for oversight.”138
 
 
According to SOFAZ, “the Fund’s activity is directed to the achievement of the following 
objectives: 
• Preservation of macroeconomic stability, ensuring fiscal-tax discipline, decreasing 
dependence on oil revenues and stimulating development of the non-oil sector  
• Taking into account that oil and gas are depletable resources ensuring intergenerational 
equality with regard to the country's oil wealth and accumulate and preserve oil revenues 
for future generations 
• Financing major national scale projects to support socio-economic progress”139
 
 
According to SOFAZ the main sources of revenues include: 
  
• Proceeds generated under production sharing agreements from sales of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan's share of hydrocarbons; 
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• Bonuses paid under the terms of production sharing agreements; 
• Acreage fees paid by foreign investors for use of the contract areas in connection with the 
development of hydrocarbon resources; 
• Dividends paid under the terms of production sharing agreements; 
• Revenues generated from the transit of oil and gas over the territory of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan; 
• Revenues generated from the transfer of assets from investors; 
• Revenues from management of SOFAZ assets; 
• Grants and other disinterested aid. 
• Other income.140
 
 
According to Tsalik, even though Azerbaijan has been aggressively channeling a major part of 
its oil and gas revenues away from the state budget, there is the risk that SOFAZ funds cannot be 
used to absorb price shocks, which may lead to the government “taking advantage of the 
ambiguity surrounding SOFAZ’s expenditure rules to buy government securities and thereby 
cover its budget deficit.” This situation could lead to SOFAZ becoming the biggest creditor to 
the government and eventually its resources would dissolve in the general flow of government 
expenditures.141
 
 
Taxes paid by State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), do not constitute part 
of the revenues which are received by SOFAZ, they are paid directly into the state budget.142
 
 
Figure 35 shows that the biggest portion of revenues in this period was from the sale of profit oil 
and gas. Furthermore the majority of expenditures were covered by transfers to the state budget. 
Transfers to the state budget from SOFAZ increased from 130 million Manat in 2004 to 3,800 
million Manat in 2008 according to the World Bank.143
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Revenues (Million Manat) (January – September 2010)   
TOTAL 9578.2 
Profit Oil and Gas 9346 
BTC (State Share) 105 
Transit Payments 5.4 
Acreage Payments 1.2 
Sale of Assets Received from Foreign Companies 1.1 
Asset Management 119.5 
Expenditures (Million Manat)   
TOTAL 3944.6 
Transfer to State Budget 3625 
Social Projects 80 
Samur Absheron Irrigation System 109.6 
Oghuz-Gabala-Baku Water Supply System 112.1 
“State Program on Education of Azerbaijani Youth Abroad in the Years 2007-
2015” 3.8 
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway  2.9 
Administrative and operational expenses 11.2 
Figure 35.144
 
 Show the revenue and expenditure statement for January-September 2010. 
Rules governing SOFAZ’s expenditures are lax, according to Tsalik, “expenditure guidelines are 
extremely general and at the discretion of the president.”145 The Fund regulations state that it can 
be used for, “socio-economic progress of the country,” for “solving the most important national 
problems,” and for the “construction and reconstruction of strategically significant 
infrastructure.”146
 
  
Furthermore the issue of the “necessity to promote the development and increase the 
competitiveness of the non-oil sector of the national economy,” should be taken into account in 
expenditure plans, according to the Rules for Preparation and Execution of the Annual Budget of 
SOFAZ.147
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According to the Fund’s website, “SOFAZ is a state extra-budgetary fund functioning as a 
separate legal entity, with its own specialist management team and government supervisory 
hierarchy. The Fund's operation is guided by the Constitution and laws of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, Presidential Decrees and Resolutions, and the Fund's Regulations. The Fund is 
responsible to the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Fund is also responsible to its 
Supervisory Board and Chamber of Accounts established by Milli Majlis (Parliament). 
Reestablishment and liquidation of the Fund is carried out by means of decree by the President of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan.”148
 
 
SOFAZ’s Supervisory Board is made up of 7 members and is chaired by the Prime-Minister of 
Azerbaijan. The 7 members consist of representatives of the executive and legislative powers, 
including government ministers and members of the Parliament who were appointed in 
accordance with presidential decree No. 73 dated November 27th 2008. The Board is to review 
the Fund's draft annual budget, annual report and financial statements along with independent 
auditor's opinion and provide its comments.149
  
 
“SOFAZ is led by the Executive Director, who is appointed and dismissed by the President of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Fund's Executive Director carries out operational management 
of the Fund's activities. The Executive Director may appoint and dismisses employees of the 
Fund in a manner as determined by the legislation. The Investment Board, comprising senior 
officials of the Fund, manages all investment related activity in SOFAZ.”150
 
“Execution of the SOFAZ budget, which has to be duly approved by the appropriate Presidential 
Decrees, is undertaken in line with a set of asset management guidelines (AMG) and specified 
expenditures. SOFAZ assets are managed in accordance with AMG approved by the Presidential 
Decree on "Asset Management Rules (Guidelines) for the State Oil Fund of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan" # 511 dated June 19, 2001”
 
151
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According to Tsalik, “one of the first provisions in the Fund’s regulations states, “The Fund shall 
be accountable and responsible to the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan.”” She claims that 
“there are no limitations to the president’s discretion,” that, “there are no checks and balances to 
provide oversight,” and that, “all strategic decisions are made by the president, including the 
decision to liquidate the fund all together.”152 Furthermore, Tsalik states that, “…parliament has 
no role whatsoever in Azerbaijan. This absence of a role for parliament does not fit with the Oil 
Fund’s function of serving to protect “the interests of citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan and 
their future generations.” Members of parliament are elected by Azerbaijan’s citizens and, as 
such, should have a voice in decisions over how the country’s wealth is being stored and 
spent.”153
 
 
In stark contrast, there is a statement on the Fund’s website in response to the question, “Is 
SOFAZ activity beyond the authority and control of the Parliament?” which states, “No. Any 
suggestion that SOFAZ works beyond the reach of the Parliament is false. In accordance with the 
Law "About Budget System" of the Republic of Azerbaijan, all SOFAZ revenues and 
expenditures are incorporated as part of an annual consolidated government budget and approved 
by the Parliament. The Fund is audited by the Accounting Chamber, which is under the control 
of the Parliament and reports directly to the Parliament. Moreover, the Fund's activity is 
controlled by the Supervisory Board comprising governmental representatives and members of 
Parliament.”154
 
 
In terms of transparency, the Fund’s website is “also fairly comprehensive.” Transparency is 
referred to as a key objective in SOFAZ’s annual report and on their website, which includes the 
regulations governing the report, the annual report, and announcements of tenders. The annual 
report is also fairly comprehensive in its description of the legal and administrative framework of 
SOFAZ as well as containing the names of the members of the Supervisory Council and 
substantial financial data such as breakdowns of all proceeds from each revenue stream. 
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Furthermore the auditor’s financial statements are included in the report along with their 
corresponding notes.155
 
 
SOFAZ has played an essential role in the mitigation of the resource curse in Azerbaijan. Since 
its establishment in 1999, it has helped mitigate inflation by sterilizing large amounts revenues 
from the oil industry, it has also been effective in absorbing price shocks which may have had 
potentially catastrophic effects on the oil-dependent economy. SOFAZ has also played a role in 
financing projects which have, and will continue to benefit Azerbaijan such as the BTC pipeline 
and the future BTK railway among others.  
 
Overall the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan has been effective in an economic and 
social context. The role of the Fund as a socio-economic tool can be improved though to allow 
for an even more positive effect in years to come. Azerbaijan’s resources are limited and the next 
twenty years are crucial to the future of the country and its population. To maximize the benefits 
the government should focus on improving the fund through the development of the legal and 
administrative rules as well as the establishment of stronger, clearer guidelines governing 
investment strategies. Furthermore the inclusion of civil society could enhance the independence 
of the supervisory council.156
 
 
5 - 2 – Transparency Initiatives and the Role of NGO’s:  
 
Tracking resource development and the use of resource revenues is made possible by 
transparency. In many oil-rich countries there is a new tendency towards pursuing long-term 
stability for the sake of future prosperity. This trend is proven by the growing enthusiasm shown 
by governments of resource-rich countries to adopt transparency initiatives and international 
standards according to Dr. Ingilab Ahmadov, Director of the Public Finance Monitoring Centre 
(PFMC) and board member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).157
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In resource rich countries, transparency in certain areas of the economy is essential to avoid 
pitfalls such as corruption, rent seeking, dubious contracts, and general bad governance. These 
areas of the economy include the state budget, macro-economic indicators, micro-economic 
indicators, government projects, contracts, and for countries with natural resource funds 
(NRF’s), inflows and outflows of revenues from NRF’s.  
 
A major step forward in the quest for transparency in Azerbaijan was made on June 17th 2003, 
when the delegation, headed by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, declared their 
decision to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and support international 
efforts for higher transparency in the extractive industries.158
 
  
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI):159
 
 
The EITI was announced by Tony Blair in 2002 the World Summit for Sustainable Development 
in Johannesburg, South Africa, and was launched in June 2003 in London. 
 
The objective of the EITI is to raise transparency in payments to the Government by foreign 
companies, and, correspondingly, bring more transparency to the revenues of the State in the 
spheres that also cover the activity of companies.  
 
Benefits for implementing countries include an improved investment climate by providing a 
clear signal to investors and international financial institutions that the government is committed 
to greater transparency. EITI also assists in strengthening accountability and good governance, as 
well as promoting greater economic and political stability. This, in turn, can contribute to the 
prevention of conflict based around the oil, mining and gas sectors. 
 
Benefits to companies and investors center on mitigating political and reputational risks. 
Political instability caused by opaque governance is a clear threat to investments. In extractive 
industries, where investments are capital intensive and dependent on long-term stability to 
generate returns, reducing such instability is beneficial for business. Transparency of payments 
made to a government can also help to demonstrate the contribution that their investment makes 
to a country. 
 
Benefits to civil society come from increasing the amount of information in the public domain 
about those revenues that governments manage on behalf of citizens, thereby making 
governments more accountable. 
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To date, Azerbaijan is a leader in the number of reports submitted to the EITI, with 12 reports. 
“However, EITI reports in Azerbaijan do not provide opportunity for reviewing payments by 
separate companies and limits investigation opportunities in this field. Despite the numerous 
applications to extractive companies in Azerbaijan, most of them rejected from providing 
information stating it a commercial secret.”160
 
 
On May 13th 2004, the coalition “For Improving Transparency in Extractive Industries” was 
formed. This coalition was formed, “in an effort to ensure public control over the revenues 
obtained through the exploitation of the country's natural resources and their effective use.”161 A 
coalition of Azerbaijani NGO’s with the following objectives:162
 
 
• organization and implementation of public control over the safe storage, complete return 
to the state and effective use of Azerbaijan's share of the revenues obtained from the 
exploitation of the country's natural resources; 
• implementation of the activities aimed at informing the Azerbaijani citizens of the 
exploitation of the country's natural resources and of the earned revenues, including the 
organization and implementation of public control over such activities of state bodies and 
companies; 
• joining the efforts of civil society institutions in the area of transparency and in this way 
stepping up the level of public activity; 
• ensuring the representation of Azerbaijani public associations in the British government's 
"Transparency Initiative in Extractive Industries", which has been joined by the 
Azerbaijani government. 
 
The coalition is also a part of the “Publish What You Pay” (PWYP) campaign which is a global 
network of organizations united in the search for transparency in oil, gas and mining revenues. 
Their aim is to promote development and improve the lives of ordinary citizens in resource-rich 
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countries. “PWYP undertakes public campaigns and policy advocacy to achieve disclosure of 
information about extractive industry revenues and contracts.”163
 
 
The Public Finance Monitoring Centre is an Organization set up on June 1st 2003 under the 
financing of the Open Society Institute. “The Center based its activities on continuing the idea 
“Publish What You Pay” by George Soros and initiative “Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative” T.Blair, on the national level. At present PFMC is one of the more active 
organizations involved in this direction in Azerbaijan.”164
 
 
The PFMC’s partners include PWYP, EITI, EITI-Coalition in Azerbaijan, Revenue Watch, and 
SOFAZ, among others. Its goals consist mainly in achieving efficient management over public 
finances, promoting public involvement in the efficient use of public finances, and achieving 
more effective and transparent use of public finances.165
 
 
Other organizations and NGO’s operating in Azerbaijan for the promotion of transparency 
include Global Witness, Revenue Watch, and the Central and Eastern Europe Bankwatch, among 
others. 
 
The prioritization of transparency by the government of Azerbaijan is one of the key elements 
which make the country so attractive to international oil companies (IOCs), such as BP. IOCs put 
great importance on their global image and operating in countries like Azerbaijan, that are well 
respected globally for their efforts to promote transparency, is a factor that contributes to a good 
company image. NGO’s play a major role in achieving higher levels of transparency in 
Azerbaijan. 
 
According to Svetlana Tsalik, there are too many constraints placed on NGO’s in Azerbaijan, 
which results in an obstacle to public participation in the budgetary process. She states that the 
right of freedom of association is guaranteed by Azerbaijan’s constitution and further backed by 
its membership in the Council of Europe.  
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The development of civil society groups in Azerbaijan has been difficult but with the success of 
such organizations like the PFMC and the EITI coalition “For Improving Transparency in 
Extractive Industries”, it is clearly visible that Azerbaijan is moving forward and encouraging 
progress is being made.  
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Conclusion: 
 
This research paper shows that Azerbaijan’s authorities have made significant economic 
advances over the last ten years. The country has managed to avoid numerous pitfalls which have 
been seen in other oil-rich states, such as the massive accumulation of debt and oil revenue 
fueled spending sprees. The challenges Azerbaijan will face in coming years will be augmented 
by the short life span of its oil and gas reserves.  Based on current predictions the country has a 
period of about twenty years to reduce poverty, and create opportunities for its population 
through the development of the economy. To do this it is essential to move away from the 
extremely high dependence on oil and gas and focus on the development of the non-oil sectors of 
the economy so as to ensure sustainable economic prosperity beyond oil and gas.166
 
 
It is important to bear in mind that the scope of this research papers is limited to the economic 
element of the resource curse, the other two elements being political and social. In purely 
economic terms I do believe, based on my findings that Azerbaijan is suffering from the 
“resource curse.” 
 
Despite government efforts, to date, elements of Dutch disease are visible (Chapter 3). An issue 
which is of concern, is that since Hoffman observed that Azerbaijan was showing a susceptibility 
to Dutch Disease in 1999167, there has been a continuous flow of concerns voiced by such 
sources as Svetlana Tsalik168, The Economist169, the IMF170
 
, and many other sources over the 
last decade that the situation is not improving.  
 The high value of the currency (Manat), the low exports and high imports as well as the inflation 
rate show us that the oil-revenues are having a negative impact on the non-oil sector. There are 
counter arguments, stating that the REER’s (real effective exchange rate) appreciation is 
relatively modest, and that, if Azerbaijan adjusts its oil spending downwards, the rate of high 
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inflows of oil revenues will be sustainable. Despite this, judging by current spending patterns, 
there is a real danger of Dutch Disease in the economy. This conclusion is based on the current 
spending pattern of the government and the fact that 3 of the four primary trading partners of 
Azerbaijan (Italy, USA, and France) currently have much lower interest rates than that of 
Azerbaijan. 
 
The efforts to direct foreign currency received from the sale of its oil and gas away from the state 
budget so as to mitigate the effects of Dutch disease, seem to be insufficient as inflation is on the 
rise as of January 2010 reaching above 5 percent despite a consistent drop throughout 2009.  
 
It is visible that as oil revenues have increased, so have the expenditures from the state budget. 
There are also factors that point to inefficient government spending, such as investments in non-
sustainable projects, so called “white elephants,” as well as ineffective projects such as 
infrastructure that “require reconstruction immediately after completion.171
 
”  
Furthermore there are multiple factors that indicate that de-industrialization has been occurring 
in Azerbaijan and appears to continue to do so. The agricultural sector is suffering from a lack of 
investment and movement of the labor force to alternative sectors. Despite decreases in poverty 
figures, poverty is still a serious issue in Azerbaijan especially in rural areas.  
 
Another factor which points to the “resource curse” is the movement of the labor force away 
from the primary industries, such as agriculture, and investment to non-tradable sectors of the 
economy. This is accompanied by non-competitiveness of locally produced products on 
international markets. 
 
Probably the most important choice made by Azerbaijan was to maintain full state ownership 
over its energy reserves, inviting foreign companies (IOCs) to assume the role of development, 
thereby minimizing the risk associated to oil discovery, extraction, and development. This is 
what has differentiated Azerbaijan from other post-Soviet states such as Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan, who have both maintained state ownership of their oil and gas reserves, but 
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rejected direct involvement of IOCs. On the other hand, the Russian Federation privatized its 
extractive industry domestically and only allowed a limited amount of international involvement. 
In contrast, Kazakhstan fully privatized the industry by selling the majority of its shares to 
foreign companies.172
 
  
Despite these different approaches adopted after the collapse of the Soviet Union, these states all 
have certain characteristics in common. Due to the fact that the Soviet Union owned all the 
resources, these states all inherited the same political and institutional structure for the 
management of their oil and gas reserves, as well as centralized policy making, economic 
planning and regionally based administrative-territorial system.173
 
 
These elements constitute the particularity of Post-Soviet states such as Azerbaijan. These states 
have barely 20 years of independence and have based their growth and evolution on oil and gas 
resources, while simultaneously re-developing their institutional and political systems, social 
infrastructure, and laying down foundations for civil society.  
 
The adaptation of existing systems and industry which had been highly centralized during the 
Soviet era and which received a heavy blow with the collapse of the S.U. has proven to be a 
difficult task. In the case of Azerbaijan I believe that a very significant amount of progress has 
been made in the last 20 years.  
 
Contrary to the case of other resource rich countries in different regions, such as in Africa, 
Azerbaijan and other newly independent states began their oil-led development with the 
remnants of existing infrastructure, political, educational, and institutional systems as well as the 
industrial systems remaining after the collapse of the S.U.  
 
Despite this, the driving force behind the rapid development of Azerbaijan is its extractive 
industry, which has led to the high economic dependence that is evident today. 
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Many of the elements covered in this research paper point to the fact that Azerbaijan is suffering 
from the negative economic effects that are commonly associated with the resource curse. 
However the scale of these effects is not unmanageable. As mentioned previously, there have 
been many positive steps taken in recent years to counter these effects. The most important of 
which was the establishment of SOFAZ and the government’s acknowledgement of the 
importance of transparency. 
 
The Post-Soviet resource curse is a result of the oil-led rapid development of the economy which 
followed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This left these newly independent states in a 
seemingly hopeless situation, politically, socially and economically.  
 
On the economic front, I believe the main areas that the government should focus on, are the 
reduction of the country’s dependence on oil and gas revenues and the investment in non-oil 
related industry so as to diversify revenue streams. Furthermore the ongoing efforts to fight 
poverty and unemployment should be stepped up. The government should seek to reduce 
inflation to promote competitiveness, as well as emphasizing the development of tradable sectors 
over non-tradable sectors of the economy. Finally efforts must be made to improve the legal and 
administrative structure of SOFAZ, as well as that of civil society in Azerbaijan. 
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